Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Deliberation : Why Not Everything Should be Connected by Moore, Alfred James
This is a repository copy of Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Deliberation : Why Not 
Everything Should be Connected.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/124760/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Moore, Alfred James orcid.org/0000-0002-7252-5039 (2017) Anonymity, Pseudonymity, 
and Deliberation : Why Not Everything Should be Connected. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. ISSN 1467-9760 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12149
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
  !1
Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Deliberation: 
Why Not Everything Should Be Connected  *
ALFRED MOORE 
Politics, University of York 
Accepted for publication in The Journal of Political Philosophy, 7 November 2017 
The discussion of anonymity and deliberation has repeatedly circled around two 
contradictory normative positions. One is that anonymity is valuable because it enables 
expression free from fear of repercussions. The other is that anonymity is destructive because 
it enables expression free from fear of repercussions. The same feature that enables a 
teenager from a repressive religious community to talk freely about his sexuality without fear 
of exposure also enables cruel and abusive responses that may inhibit such expressions.  
This sort of trade-off has become especially salient in the context of online political talk 
of the sort found in news commenting spaces. In lieu of costly moderation, some online news 
sites are shifting towards requiring real-name identification of commenters in order to avoid 
the pitfalls of easy anonymity, increasingly outsourcing their commenting architecture to 
Facebook, whose spokespeople have argued that for safetyÕs sake, Ôanonymity on the internet 
has to go awayÕ.  The hope is that real-name environments would limit abusive behaviour by 1
binding users to discursive norms rooted in community. Would you talk like that in front of 
your mother? But real-name environments, in which people tend to know each other and 
This paper benefited from four great audiences at the Cambridge Workshop in Political Philosophy; the Ash *
Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University; the APSR annual conference 
2016; and the ECPR general conference 2016. I would like to thank Richard Danbury, Rolf Fredheim, 
Archon Fung, Sean Gray, Andrew McKenzie-McHarg, Michael MacKenzie, John Naughton, Jn 
îlafsson, David Vincent, Melissa Williams, Dominik Wyss, Ethan Zuckerman, and the anonymous 
reviewers at JPP for their insightful and constructive comments and suggestions. This research comes 
out of a project on online commenting supported by Leverhulme grant no. RP2012-CO17 and 
conducted with my colleagues Rolf Fredheim and John Naughton, to whom I owe special thanks.
In the words of Randi Zuckerberg, marketing director of Facebook and sister of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman 1
and CEO (quoted in Chun 2015, p. 105). Facebook VP Elliot Schrage stated that ÔFacebook has always 
been based on a real-name culture. We fundamentally believe this leads to greater accountability and a 
safer and more trusted environment for people who use the serviceÕ (quoted in Sengupta (2011)). 
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share a broad set of perspectives, values, and opinions, create their own problems of 
conformity and social pressure. This suggests a practically difficult but conceptually simple 
trade-off between the goods and dangers associated with anonymous and real-name 
architectures. If you want users to be able to express themselves without fear of retribution or 
pressures towards conformity, you have to accept that they may use that freedom to be cruel 
and abusive. And if you want to bind users to the norms of community, you have to accept 
the risk that users will censor themselves, seek to avoid conflict, and be subject to the 
pressures and expectations associated with their offline social identities.  
What can political theory add to this discussion? In as much as anonymity involves the 
concealment of the identity of an actor, it can release the actor from inhibitions generated by 
the audience. But whether this is good or bad depends on the context, group norms, the 
audience, and so on, and must be determined empirically on a case-by-case basis. I therefore 
do not aim to make an argument about the value of anonymity in deliberation as such. Rather, 
I offer a conceptual analysis that separates out elements of identity and discusses their 
distinctive deliberative potentials. This preliminary conceptual work will, I hope, support and 
enrich the analysis of anonymity, pseudonymity, and deliberation in particular empirical 
contexts. 
To the extent that anonymity has been considered at all in relation to deliberation, it has 
been framed in one of two main ways. The first is in relation to communicative 
accountability. J. S. Mill gives an emblematic version of this approach in his argument 
against secret voting, where identifiability is a means to demand justification for peopleÕs 
actions, and thereby privileges actions Ôof which at least some decent account can be givenÕ.  2
The second way is to frame anonymity in terms of protecting the private space necessary for 
the development of the self. This way of framing the problem focuses on the value of privacy 
to the constitution of the public sphere. If we understand the public sphere as Ôa forum in 
which the private people, come together to form a public, É to compel public authority to 
legitimate itself before public opinionÕ,  then the existence of the public sphere entails the 3
protection of the private sphere. The public sphere requires a distinct mode of public 
appearance. Public appearance is often modelled in terms of face-to-face communication, or 
Mill 1977, p. 493.2
Habermas 1989, p. 25Ð6.3
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small group contexts, in which each can be known to all. But it also requires norms and 
mechanisms of impersonality in public. Anonymity is one such mechanism. This mechanism 
is worth closer analysis because online communication has created and made more 
ubiquitous a set of possibilities for masking and revealing identities, in ways whose effects 
are not yet understood, andÑI will suggestÑneed to be analysed within a richer framework 
than that of anonymous and real-name communication.  
In this article, I analyse anonymity in terms of two dimensions of identity disclosure: 
durability and connectedness. Durability refers to the ease or difficulty with which identities 
can be acquired and changed. A durable identity need not be a real name, but it must be stable 
over time within a particular context. This dimension has come to the fore in the context of 
online communication. The concept of durability opens up a distinction between easy 
anonymity, in which actors are able to easily create new and multiple identities, and stable or 
durable pseudonyms. It is this stability, I shall argue, that grounds the possibility of a limited 
ÔinternalÕ communicative accountability. Connectedness refers to bridging and linking 
communication across different social contexts. This dimension can be illustrated by rules or 
norms of non-disclosure about who said what in a particular deliberative context, designed to 
block the connection of persons to statements, of which the Chatham House Rules are a well-
known example. In the online context the use of real names opens the possibility of 
connectedness in the sense that your statements can potentially become known to your 
family, colleagues, friends, and other social groups with whom you are associated. 
Connectedness enables statements to be attributed to particular individuals and thereby travel 
with them into different social contexts. Connectedness is distinct from a third element, 
traceability, which involves the capacity of observers to covertly link statements to real 
persons, as the NSA might try to trace the users of an extremist chat room. While traceability 
by states or other powerful organisations marks out one sort of threat to the public sphere, in 
this paper I focus on the distinct threat that arises from social pressures made possible by 
overt connectedness. 
Separating durability and connectedness makes visible two different aspects of 
communicative accountability. First, communicative accountability appears within a 
particular discursive context, where demands for justification can be made and met in a 
temporally extended discursive exchange. This sort of internal communicative accountability 
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requires at minimum that the participants are agents and that they are durable enough to be 
recognised as such in the course of the process. I will suggest that such durability is at least 
consistent with the generation of Ôminimal deliberationÕ,  understood as the exchange of 4
arguments for or against something. The second sense of communicative accountability 
involves oneÕs actions, which requires precisely connectedness to a particular identifiable 
agent who may be required to justify how she voted or undertook some other meaningful 
political action. This is a stronger sort of communicative accountability, and it bears most 
closely on justification of the exercise of empowerments in collective decision processes. By 
separating out these two aspects of communicative accountability we can develop a more 
subtle appreciation of the value of different architectures of disclosure to generating some of 
the goods of deliberation.  5
How does my argumentÑthat durable pseudonymity can support a form of 
communicative accountability within a discursive communityÑbear on the important issue 
of polarisation and online echo chambers? We might worry that groups of like-minded people 
would be less willing to hold one another communicatively accountable, and that to the 
extent that they do challenge each other, it may be in respect of values that are particular to 
the like-minded group in question rather than more general discursive norms. Participants 
might then become polarised as they share information from a limited and skewed 
information pool; acquire confidence through corroboration; and even adjust their views in 
the direction of what they perceive to be the general tendency of the group.  This is a serious 6
concern, but it depends crucially on the question: what effect does identity disclosure have on 
the diversity of the group? And on this question there is no reason to suppose that identity 
disclosure is decisive either way. The web enables people to more easily find like-minded 
others regardless of identity disclosure policies, and we consequently see echo chamber and 
polarisation effects within networks such as Facebook, which have a strict real-name policy, 
Landemore 2013.4
In framing the relation between anonymity and deliberation I do not consider other importantÑand closely 5
relatedÑways in which anonymity influences the behaviour of political actors and the structure of the 
public sphere, such as through non-disclosure of campaign contributions (Ayers 2000). I also do not 
consider in any detail the possible value of anonymity within collective decision processes, such as 
voting within juries (see Elster 2013, pp. 98Ð139).
See Sunstein (2009) on the theory of group polarisation, and Sunstein (2017) for his most recent discussion of 6
these concerns as applied to the Internet and social media.
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as well as on discussion platforms such as 4chan, which exemplify radical anonymity. 
Furthermore, there is evidence from experiments and observational studies that more 
stringent identification policies on online forums tend to reduce participation,  and this in 7
turn could result in less diversity, simply on the grounds that a group of a thousand people is 
likely to be less diverse than a group of ten thousand. However, while the degree of diversity 
and the willingness to engage with those who are not like-minded are the key factors in 
producing echo chamber effects, it is an openÑand empiricalÑquestion how far these 
qualities are influenced by the mode of identification of the participants. Indeed, one aim of 
this paper is to differentiate our conception of anonymity in order to elaborate the terms 
within which we might ask these questions. 
I. Disaggregating Anonymity 
Writing under an assumed name or no name at all has long been practised in domains ranging 
from literature to philosophy  to political argument; indeed, the set of essays published under 8
the pseudonym ÔPubliusÕ count among the most notable contributions to American political 
thought and underpinned public debate on the ratification of the United States Constitution. 
Among the many reasons for writing under a pseudonym, one has a special deliberative 
pedigree: the idea that arguments should stand or fall on their own merits rather than the 
social position of their authors. Christoph Martin Wieland, publisher of a late eighteenth-
century magazine devoted to the ideals of the Enlightenment, thus defended anonymity in 
terms of discursive equality: ÔThe most nameless son of this earth has the same right to speak 
as the president of the academy, if he has something clever to say.Õ  Given this background, it 9
is perhaps surprising that mainstream theories of the public sphere have tended to pay little 
attention to anonymity, and even less to pseudonymity. For example, anonymity features in 
See, for instance, Rowe (2015) and a survey of empirical research by Davies and Chandler (2012).7
Kierkegaard (2009, pp. 528, 529) wrote several of his early works under pseudonyms. He declared of these 8
pseudonymous works that Ôthere is not a single word by myself É My wish, my prayer, therefore, is 
that if it should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular remark from the [pseudonymous] books, 
he will do me the favour of citing the name of the respective pseudonymous author.Õ
Wieland 1773, p. 14. I thank Andrew McKenzie-McHarg for bringing this to my attention, and I use his 9
translation.
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HabermasÕs account of the public sphere, but it is largely in the context of the anonymous 
relations among strangers that constitute market mechanisms,  and later through his 10
reframing of popular sovereignty in terms of Ôsubjectless and anonymousÕ flows of 
communication channeled by democratic procedures.  This is not anonymity in the sense of 11
a concealed source, but rather no single source at all. When it comes to his model of 
communicative interaction Habermas builds up from an account of face to face conversation, 
and face to face communication under conditions of anonymity or pseudonymity would be of 
no real interest in constructing a general account of communicative interaction. It thus hardly 
needs to be said of HabermasÕs discourse theory that the agents who make and meet demands 
for communicative justification at the level of discourse proper are identifiable agents. 
In face-to-face contexts anonymity is a more marginal phenomenon. One might think 
of the casual conversation among strangers on a delayed train or at a football match. But 
although people in such situations may not exchange names, they have a rich set of personal 
characteristics and contextual cues through which they can locate each other, and in any case 
interactions in this context tend to be evanescent and superficial. When it comes to more 
sustained discussion, we might consider spaces in which participants are known to one 
another but rules of non-disclosure prevent statements from being attributed to particular 
speakers (as in Chatham House Rules). But while statements in such a case are effectively 
anonymous from the point of view of the audience, we are not really dealing with face-to-
face anonymity. Pseudonymity is yet more marginal.  A rare example of face-to-face 12
pseudonymity is described by Wolfgang Leonhard (1957) in his recollections of the 
Comintern School he attended in Russia in the early 1940s.  At his induction, the secretary 13
described the school rules, and gave special emphasis to the last: ÔYou are not permitted to 
give your real name to anyone, or to mention any facts whatever about your previous life. I 
should like to impress on you that conformity to this rule is absolutely imperative. No one, 
Habermas 1989, p. 79.10
Habermas 1997, p. 58Ð9.11
The device of people communicating while they pretend to be someone else has often found a place in literary 12
and dramatic contexts, such as in MozartÕs Marriage of Figaro. But their use in these contexts merely 
underscores the implausibility of face-to-face pseudonymous communication in most everyday 
contexts.
I thank Jn îlafsson for bringing this to my attention.13
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not even though you may perhaps have known them in the past, is allowed to know your real 
name.Õ  He then recounts meeting a boy he had known from before, who spoke animatedly 14
to him until he remembered the rule, at which point they gave their pseudonyms. 
It was a peculiar thingÑhardly had he mentioned his new Party name than he 
underwent a complete transformation. He answered my questions cautiously and 
hesitatingly. É In a few seconds Jan had changed from an enthusiastic member of the 
Komsomol into a Party official, exercising complete control over himself and choosing 
his words with scrupulous care.  15
This example highlights not only the difficulty of maintaining pseudonymity in face-to-face 
contexts, but alsoÑand importantly for my argument in this paperÑthe way in which modes 
of identification can contribute to the creation of a community with a distinctive discursive 
character.  
Online communication has given new salience to the potentials and problems of 
anonymity and pseudonymity. Different online designs can offer different degrees of 
identifiability, in spaces ranging from small specialist chat rooms to the deeply anonymous 
4chan to comment sections of newspapers and news blogs. While I set out in this article to 
raise some general questions about anonymity and communicative accountability, the 
examples foremost in my mind are those associated with online political talk, as exemplified 
in commenting on news websites. In the context of thinking about deliberative democracy, 
online commenting has particular salience because it involves online talk about matters of 
common or public concern rather than specific interests of the sort that might be found on a 
blog about cooking. Commenting is also relevant to the concerns of deliberative democrats 
because it exemplifies one major novelty of what Yochai Benkler calls the Ônetworked public 
sphereÕ:  that it opens up the possibility of two-way communication as opposed to the one-16
Leonhard 1957, pp. 171-2.14
Ibid, p. 173.15
Benkler 2006, p. 212.16
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way mass media models of the public sphere.  As Benkler argues, even when we simply read 17
an article, the fact that we have the potential to respond through online comments transforms 
us from Ôpassive readers and listeners to potential speakers and participants in a 
conversationÕ.  Benkler treats this feature as a sort of transfiguration of citizenship, a 18
qualitative shift 
in the experience of being a potential speaker, as opposed to simply a listener and a 
voter. É The way we listen to what we hear changes because of this; as does, perhaps 
most fundamentally, the way we observe and process daily events in our lives. We no 
longer need to take these as merely private observations, but as potential subjects for 
public communication.  19
This broad shift in the capacity for public communication about matters of common concern 
draws attention to the particular architectures or online institutional designs within which 
such discussion might take place.  There are many different ways in which such online 20
institutional designs can promote, shape, and constrain public communication. But one 
important design feature, and the one on which I will concentrate in this paper, is the degree 
of identity disclosure. 
By combining aspects of both written and spoken discourseÑin particular, the 
possibility of the rapid exchange and evanescence of speech, but the relative permanence of 
written discourseÑonline spaces enable the use of degrees and modes of identity disclosure 
that are not easily available offline. Sociologist Gary Marx distinguishes seven elements of 
personal identification: legal name; locatability; traceable pseudonymity or pseudo-
anonymity; untraceable pseudonymity; pattern knowledge; social categorisation (e.g., 38-
Online commenting allows readers to debate issues with each other and thus represents a platform for a 17
Ôculture-debatingÕ rather than merely Ôculture-consumingÕ public. And to the extent that the Ôonline 
debates of web users É crystallise around the focal points of the quality press, for example, national 
newspapers and political magazinesÕ (Habermas 2006, p. 423, n3), we can treat them as sites of 
political communication.
Benkler 2006, p. 213.18
Ibid.19
See Farrell and Schwartzberg (2008) on the value of applying insights from electoral law and constitutional 20
design to online collective decision procedures.
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year-old mother of two); and symbols of eligibility, such as passwords, tattoos, or other 
codes.  Ruesch and Marker describe a range of forms of identifiability of online 21
commenters, distinguishing registered and unregistered; pseudonymous or real-name; 
verified or unverified; hidden or visible; and linked or not linked to other personal data.  22
Online news platforms present a huge range of different forms of disclosure of user identity. 
However, for the purposes of addressing the question of the connection between anonymity 
and deliberation, we can disaggregate anonymity into three dimensions: traceability, 
durability, and connectedness. 
Traceability refers to the extent to which your contributions can be traced to your real 
identity. Traceability is distinct from disclosure of identity to fellow commenters. You can 
make comments under a pseudonym and yet it is often possible (with some effort) for 
advertisers or security services to trace your real identity. Whether an online identity 
is verified or unverified, for instance, bears on the dimension of traceability. Many 
commentators are concerned about online anonymity in the dimension of traceability, and 
seek mechanisms by which online users can remain ÔunreachableÕ or ÔuntraceableÕ by 
advertisers or public agencies. Zarsky, for instance, talks of anonymity in the context of Ôthe 
right to read, write, speak, and distribute content without exposing the identity of the relevant 
individualÕ.  The analogy here is with the use of cash rather than a credit card; cash is 23
untraceable, whereas a credit card leaves a record of your purchases. Nissenbaum, similarly, 
argues that anonymity online, in the sense of Ôconducting oneÕs affairs, communicating, or 
engaging in transactions É without oneÕs name being knownÕ,  is undermined by 24
technologies that have made it possible to track or piece together the real identities of citizens 
online even when they are withholding their names or using pseudonyms. She frames the 
value of anonymity in terms of being ÔunreachableÕ.  Froomkin is also centrally concerned 25
Marx 1999.21
Ruesch and Mrker 2012.22
Zarsky 2004, p. 1025.23
Nissenbaum 1999, p. 141.24
Nissenbaum 1999, p. 143.25
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with traceability, and distinguishes between traceable and untraceable anonymity.  26
Traceability is clearly important to deliberation. Traceability by governmental and private 
actors has the potential to chill or constrain online communication, in so far as it creates the 
risk of exposure and retaliation for speech that offends powerful actors. While there are good 
reasons to resist traceability, there are also good reasons to want users to be traceable, such as 
identifying those who make threats or engage in hate speech and abuse.  Depending on the 27
sort of examples we have in mind, we might emphasise one or other of these reasons, but in 
either case, the issues run slightly to the side of my concerns about online deliberation. 
Traceability, then, presents an important threat to the public sphere, but in this article I focus 
on the distinct threat posed by connectedness, which turns on the pressures of social 
conformity enabled by identifiability with respect to other participants in online 
communication. I am interested in the functions and effects of anonymity and pseudonymity 
with respect to other participants in online communication. 
Durability refers to the ease or difficulty with which online identities can be acquired 
and changed. Where new pseudonyms are easy to create, online identities are disposable; if 
you acquire a reputation for abusive or untrustworthy behaviour you can just create a new 
pseudonym and start again. Cheap pseudonyms create Ôopportunities to misbehave without 
paying reputational consequencesÕ.  Where hurdles such as registration and verification are 28
introduced, it remains possible to create new identities, but it becomes a little harder and 
more time-consuming. Users are more likely to stick with a particular name. This opens them 
to the reputational consequences of their behaviour. This dimension is particularly important 
for the possibility of holding commentators accountable for claims they make, enabling 
challenges in terms of consistency, and exposing uncivil or abusive commenters to sanctions. 
Such communicative accountability need not require a real-world identity, but it does, at a 
minimum, require durability or persistence of identity within a particular discursive platform 
or event.  
Froomkin 1995.26
This is the primary focus of Levmore and Nussbaum (2010) in their collection of essays on the Ôoffensive 27
internetÕ.
Resnick and Friedman 2001, p. 173.28
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The third dimension has to do with connectedness or bridging across different 
platforms and contexts. A user might want to comment on a sports forum but not have their 
comments linked to their professional networks. They might not want their comments on 
political issues to be visible on their social networks. They might prefer their contributions to 
different conversations to be like islands, so to speak, and for their various different domains 
of interest to be kept separate. Connectedness or bridging also involves reputation, but it is a 
global rather than local reputation. The durability or stickiness of an online identity is a 
necessary condition for building a local reputation, but it need not be connected to the wider 
reputation, a cross-referenced, cross-platform (including real-life) reputation, of the sort you 
would want if you were renting out your apartment to someone you didnÕt know (as in 
Airbnb).  
This scheme highlights that there are two overlapping ways of framing the common 
distinction between anonymity and real-name communication. One is to emphasise 
connectedness, the way speech can be linked up across different discursive contexts and 
ultimately to your real-world identity and action. This draws attention to the difference 
between anonymity and pseudonymity on the one hand, and real-name communication on the 
other, and suggests that the key issue is the connection between your words and real-world 
actions. The other is to focus on the distinction between durable and non-durable identities. 
The key issue here is communicative accountability in the context of the forum itself.  
II. The Deliberative Value of Anonymity 
A. Anonymity and Accountability 
There are two main lines of argument about the dangers and the benefits of online anonymity, 
which I will discuss in the next two sections, and they both focus on the dimension of 
connectedness rather than durability. Those who warn of the dangers of anonymity have 
emphasised the way in which it enables people to evade accountability for what they say and 
do. J. S. Mill developed this line of argument in his discussion of secret ballots. Here Mill 
was motivated by concerns about popular unaccountability, that is, about people exercising a 
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share of public power without a requirement to justify their actions. MillÕs primary argument 
against the secret ballot was that it would lead voters to understand their role not as a public 
trust issuing from a share of power of collective decision, but rather as a private possession: 
ÔThe interpretation which he [the ordinary citizen] is almost sure to put upon secret voting is 
that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference to those who are not allowed to know 
how he gives it; but may bestow it simply as he feels inclined.Õ  Mill admitted the possibility 29
of bribery or threat from employers, landlords, or customers, but thought that the more 
important danger at that time was that voters would evade the need to be Ôanswerable to the 
publicÕ for their actions.  The value of publicity is to Ôcompel deliberation, and force every 30
one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actionsÕ.  By 31
ÔdeliberationÕ here, Mill seems to have meant deliberation in the sense of internal reflection,  32
but the mechanism he invokes for prompting such deliberation is the anticipation of having to 
account for oneÕs actions to others: ÔEven the bare fact of having to give an account of their 
conduct, is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent 
account can be given.Õ  Mill did not seek to close the gap between public and private 33
opinions. He did not frame the value of public answerability in terms of enforcing 
consistency between public and private views. Citizens may well remain aware of the gap 
between their particular interests and their publicly defensible judgement of the public good, 
but, Mill thought, the mechanism of publicity would motivate them to favour the latter.  The 34
anticipation of a demand for communicative accountability for an action to those affected by 
it would Ôforce every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account 
Mill 1977, p. 489.29
Ibid., p. 493. See Buchstein (2015) for an excellent discussion of MillÕs argument for public voting in its 30
historical context.
Mill 1977, p. 493.31
See Goodin (2003) on the value of Ôdeliberation withinÕ.32
Mill 1977, p. 493.33
Sunstein (1995) makes precisely this point against KuranÕs (1997) argument in Private Truths, Public Lies: 34
Ôsometimes the public preferences are authentic in the sense that they correspond to what people think, 
on reflection, to be bestÕ. 
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for his actionsÕ.  MillÕs argument turns on the demand for consistency between oneÕs public 35
justifications and oneÕs actions. 
Many contemporary critics of online anonymity share this framing of anonymity as a 
means to evade accountability for oneÕs actions. The cloak of anonymity enables people to 
engage in harassment, threats, bullying, defamation, lying, reputational damage, misogyny, 
and provision of false information, and protects them from legal sanctions. The main 
questions from this point of view concern the proper balance of claims to freedom of speech 
against rights to privacy, and the most appropriate means to enforce accountability. Martha 
Nussbaum, for instance, regards anonymity as a mask for misogynistic abuse and the 
objectification of women. She focuses on the case of two Yale law students who were 
anonymously attacked by their classmates on a law school message-board called AutoAdmit, 
and who in June 2007 filed a suit against one of the siteÕs administrators and several of the 
anonymous commenters. NussbaumÕs central argument concerns the motivation behind 
online misogyny, but she regards the Internet in general and anonymity in particular as 
supporting factors in the exacerbation of misogyny, since Ôthe ability of the bloggers to create 
a new world in which they exercise power and the women are humiliated depends on their 
ability to insulate their Internet selves from responsibility in the real world, while ensuring 
real-world consequences for the womanÕ.  Similar problems can be seen with racial abuse. 36
Black and minority ethnic students at Colgate University found themselves being racially 
abused by their classmates on YikYak, a local anonymous chat platform, with precisely the 
subjective damage that Nussbaum highlights in the case of the AutoAdmit abuse, as students 
were effectively stalked by their classmates.   37
Saul Levmore takes a similarly dim view of online anonymity, describing the Internet 
as Ôthe natural and well-evolved successor to the bathroom wallÕ  and asking why it should 38
be regulated with a lighter touch than television, newspapers, or radio. Where entry costs are 
low and participation is anonymous, online discourse will tend to be Ôoffensive and noisyÕ, 
Mill 1977, p. 493. 35
Nussbaum 2010, p. 85.36
Stone and Kincaid 2014.37
Levmore 2010, p. 54.38
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Ôjuvenile and destructiveÕ.  Anonymity Ôallows communication without retributionÕ.  He 39 40
recommends a combination of moderation (recommending Ônotice-and-takedownÕ policies) 
and the introduction of identifiability (or traceability, in my terms) as ways to reduce the 
abuse and the noise and Ôprovide more useful communicationsÕ,  and concludes with a 41
prediction: 
I anticipate that more Internet entrepreneurs will limit participation or require 
identification. É ÔRespectableÕ sites will require identification (non-anonymity) and 
this will severely limit sites where people comment on a professor or classmateÕs 
anatomy or alleged promiscuity. There will be some loss of opportunities to flatter, 
criticize, and convey information. But inasmuch as this information would have been 
lost in the midst of much noise, most of us will not and should not mourn the loss.  42
LevmoreÕs prediction has been borne out in so far as an increasing number of online news 
providers have opted to either close their comments sections or introduce some means of 
identifying their users. 
These criticisms of online anonymity highlight an important point. Cruel and abusive 
behaviour not only inflicts harms on particular individuals; it also degrades discourse. And 
the criticisms point to two kinds of remedy. Levmore rightly advocates moderation practices 
as one measure for tackling such behaviour, but moderation policies workÑand are crucial to 
discussion quality Ñwhether or not participantsÕ real identities are visible to each other. And 43
both Nussbaum and Levmore emphasise the need for traceability in order to retrospectively 
punish those who violate the law, which would plausibly have a (desirable) chilling effect on 
threatening and abusive speech. This solution is framed in terms of removing anonymity, yet 
there is a difference between users being traceable by public authorities for the purposes of 
Ibid. 2010, p. 50. 39
Levmore 1996, p. 2192-3.40
Levmore 2010, p. 66. 41
Ibid., p. 67.42
Grimmelmann 2015.43
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retrospective punishment, and users being overtly identifiable to one another on the platform 
itself. Thus, an intermediary platform could hold the userÕs identity, reserving the possibility 
of revealing it to the relevant authorities, but masking that identity from other users. The 
question of how to deal with the very real problem of cruel and abusive online behaviour is 
separable from the question of deliberative effects of variation in identifiability to other 
participants.  
B. Anonymity and Privacy 
In a contrasting line of thought, anonymity is framed not as a threat but as a means to the 
protection of privacy. Helen Nissenbaum develops this intuition with respect to the 
challenges of maintaining control over the conditions of oneÕs exposure in the networked 
public sphere. The danger Nissenbaum finds in the Internet is the loss of everyday anonymity, 
and the pervasive pressure towards either public connectedness or traceability by commercial 
or state surveillance. Quoting Ferdinand Schoeman, she emphasises that norms of 
information disclosure vary across different contexts: ÔPeople have, and it is important that 
they maintain, different relationships with different people. Information appropriate in the 
context of one relationship may not be appropriate in another.Õ  What is important, she 44
argues, is not privacy as such, but rather Ôcontextual integrityÕ. Contemporary discussions of 
privacy in philosophy and law have focused on the protection of intimate or sensitive 
information. But what Nissenbaum calls Ôcontextual integrityÕ can be violated without the 
information necessarily being sensitive or intimate. Consider Ôthe indignation that may follow 
as simple a gesture as a stranger asking a person his or her name in a public square. By 
contrast, even if information is quite personal or intimate, people generally do not sense their 
privacy has been violated when the information requested is judged relevant to, or 
appropriate for, a particular setting or relationship.Õ  What is jarring, she suggests, is not a 45
breach of intimacy per se, but loss of control over the use of the information beyond its 
appropriate context. It is on this basis that she argues against those who claim that once 
Schoeman 1984, p. 408 (from Nissenbaum 1998, p. 584).44
Nissenbaum 1998, p. 584.45
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outside the intimate or sensitive realm, Ôno norms of privacy applyÕ; information is regarded 
as Ôdetachable from its contextÕ and Ôup for grabsÕ.  Even when the information is not 46
sensitive or intimate, inappropriate demanding or sharing of such information will arouse 
indignation, will violate the norm of contextual integrity. She calls this the problem of 
Ôprivacy in publicÕ.  However, while she reframes a right to privacy in terms of a right to 47
contextual integrity, NissenbaumÕs focus remains on protection from public intrusion, and in 
the notion of Ôprivacy in publicÕ, retains the broad framing of the problem of anonymity in 
terms of the goods of privacy. The problem of losing anonymity in the sense of becoming 
identifiable is part of the problem of traceability, and NissenbaumÕs central concern is that in 
the online context it is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent the grains of information we 
give away from being gathered up by others and used in ways that do not conform to our will 
or interests.  
However, while she is acutely sensitive to the value of anonymity as a means to 
privacy, she does not directly address the value of anonymity as a means to publicity.  To see 48
this point we can note that while both privacy and anonymity involve concealment, they 
conceal different things. As Gardner puts it, Ôprivacy generally conceals that a thing has been 
done. Anonymity, in contrast, generally conceals only who has done a thing, not that it has 
been done.Õ  Thus, in a general election it may be publicly known that a vote for candidate x 49
has been cast, but the identity of the particular voter is kept from public view. When one 
speaks privately, it is not publicly known that one has spoken at all. When one speaks 
anonymously, oneÕs speech is public while the identity of the speaker is concealed. 
Anonymity, then, involves acting publicly while concealing oneÕs identity.  
Ibid.46
Here she is pushing back against arguments for public surveillance that focus on the free public availability of 47
pieces of personal information, and which suggest that it is Ôunreasonable to prevent people from 
perceiving, noticing, and talking about the goings-on in public realmsÕ (Nissenbaum 1998, p. 573). The 
problem is that philosophers, lawyers, and policy makers, she claims, have not adjusted to a world in 
which we can no longer count on effective anonymity (in the sense of obscurity) in the public arenaÑ
when, like a jogger in the park, you can be Ôseen by hundreds, noticed by noneÕ (ibid., p. 576). The 
technological capacities enabling information aggregation and transfer mean that such effective 
anonymity is being replaced by routine monitoring and searching that amounts to stalking.
Skopek (2014, p. 1755) makes a similar observation, arguing that anonymity has been generally 48
misrecognised as an aspect or tool of privacy rather than as a means to Ôfacilitate and control the 
production and circulation of information and other social ÒgoodsÓÕ.
Gardner 2011, p. 930, n11.49
  !17
The approaches I have so far discussed share a tendency to emphasise private goods, 
whether it is protection from abuse or protection of Ôprivacy in publicÕ. Yet a similar 
ambivalence about the value of anonymity appears also in work that more directly addresses 
the large scale discursive effects of anonymity. By insulating citizens from observation and 
thus from soft social pressures or hard sanctions and punishments, anonymity can enable 
citizens to speak in public in a way that is consistent with their own private views. 
Anonymity can thus mitigate the dangers of what Timur Kuran calls Ôpreference 
falsificationÕ.  Misrepresenting oneÕs private preferences in order to align with perceived 50
public opinion, Kuran argues, brings two dangers.  One is that the suppression of minority 51
opinions in public speech can eventually lead those private opinions to weaken and wither, 
partly by individuals reducing the cognitive dissonance associated with differing from what 
other people think (or appear to think), and partly by making arguments and information in 
support of the minority opinion harder to come by in the public sphere. The other is that such 
private opinions will not disappear, but rather will be hidden from public view until a sudden 
and radical shift takes place. Kuran uses this sort of model to describe the rapid collapse of 
Soviet socialism.  This regime of enforced public silence created a false impression of 52
conformity, but in fact masked a huge amount of discontent, which led to a sudden collapse 
in support for the regime once it became clear how superficial public support for the regime 
really was. Danielle Allen uses CreonÕs regime in SophoclesÕ Antigone to make a similar 
point: Ôpolitical situations where authority is established through, and a public sphere is 
constructed out of, silence would be better understood as situations not of stability but of 
blockage and paralysis, susceptible to rapid, radical changeÕ.  Regimes that enable 53
anonymous speech may thus avoid the fragile rigidity associated with regimes of enforced 
public silence.  
However, as Allen recognises, anonymity also permits strategic action in the domain of 
speech. By concealing oneÕs identity, and further, by leading your audience to believe you are 
Kuran 1997, p. 3.50
Kuran 1997.51
Kuran 1997, p. 261. He also uses the example of affirmative action, which Kuran claims, is a source of deep 52
private white resentment at the same time as overt public support (ibid, p. 138).
Allen 2010, p. 117.53
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someone else, you can manipulate and deceive them. Anonymous speech leaves the listener 
unable to judge the interests, agendas, and biases of the speaker, and thereby creates 
opportunities for strategic and deceptive communication. This is the logic behind the use of 
automated or paid anonymous commenters to intervene in public discussion, a practice that 
has recently been revealed in the case of the Chinese and Russian governments, and in 
BritainÕs EU referendum.  Allen usefully highlights the value of anonymous speech in the 54
public sphere. But she reproduces the simple dichotomy between anonymous and identified 
speech, where identification is necessary in order for the hearer to judge and evaluate the 
speech according to its source, and the interests and biases of the speaker, but such 
connectedness (in my terms) exposes the speaker to social and political pressures to 
conformity and self-silencing. She also says little about the role of anonymity in everyday 
political talk about matters of common concern, focusing instead on the value and danger of 
anonymous accusations against powerful actors. Allen thus does not consider anonymity 
within public discussion. Thus, although both Allen and Kuran emphasise the benefits to the 
public sphere of enabling the expression of Ôprivate truthsÕ or Ôtruthful dark speech, which 
gives voice to meaningful and valuable silences and makes accurate accusationsÕ,  they 55
retain the framework of the simple distinction between identifiability and anonymity, and 
thus overlook the deliberative potentials of pseudonymity.  
C. Pseudonymity and Public Impersonality 
Many commentators, then, have observed the distinction between pure anonymity and real-
name communication, and framed anonymity as a means to evade communicative 
accountability, for both good and ill, suggesting a trade-off. This trade-off takes place in the 
realm of one of the great threats to the freedom of public opinion, namely, the capacity of 
public authorities to police speech. However, I have argued that we would benefit from 
taking a more nuanced view of anonymity and pseudonymity, and paying more attention to 
the distinct ways in which they condition communication. This draws our focus to the other 
See King et al. 2017; Alexander 2015; and Dewey 2016.54
Allen 2010, p. 130.55
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great threat to public opinion, namely the pressures of social conformity. The idea of masking 
as productive of publicity is developed by sociologist Richard Sennett, who emphasises its 
capacity to remove, or at least bracket out, various inequalities of status and social position. 
ÔWearing a maskÕ, he writes, Ôis the essence of civility. Masks permit pure sociability, 
detached from the circumstances of power, malaise, and private feeling of those who wear 
themÕ.  Western democracies over the post-war period, he suggests, have been characterised 56
by a shift in modes of public expression from Ôthe presentation of a mask to the revelation of 
oneÕs personalityÕ.  The Ôfall of public manÕ is a story of the rise of an ideology of intimacy. 57
Sennett shares the idea of privacy as a means to protection for the development of the self, 
but he emphasises in particular the harm that can come from the inability to interact in public 
without the pressure of intimacy. The modern self is Ôrobbed of the expression of certain 
creative powers which all human beings possess potentiallyÑthe powers of playÑbut which 
require a milieu at a distance from the self for their realizationÕ.  The self is Ôinjured by 58
estrangement from a meaningful impersonal lifeÕ.  The issue is not so much being private in 59
public, but being impersonal in public. Pseudonymous communication can enable the 
meeting of strangers under terms of structured impersonality.  
What Sennett is describing is a hollowing out of both the idea and the practice of 
civility. In studies of the deliberative (and not so deliberative) qualities of online discourse, 
incivility is usually taken to mean rude, abusive, or offensive language. Civility in this work 
is implicitly defined simply as refraining from obnoxious, cruel, and offensive speech. It has 
lost its positive association with impersonal modes of public interaction. To recover its lost 
meaning in the context of public life and civic duty, Sennett defines civility as Ôthe activity 
which protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each otherÕs companyÕ.  60
It is for this reason that he treats wearing a mask as the essence of civility. Much of todayÕs 
social media, for Sennett, would presumably be unsociable media. Civility in this sense may 
Sennett 1974, p. 264.56
Ibid., p. 261.57
Ibid., p. 264.58
Ibid., p. 264, my italic.59
Ibid.60
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be the key to the value of pseudonymous interaction online. Pseudonymity is a device that 
provides protection from intimacy, yet allows sufficient stability to enable the construction of 
a mask and the exercise of powers of play. Sennett draws an analogy with the city. Public 
space is space for performance. Expression and play conducted in the masks of impersonality 
are enabled by the very structure of the city, as a space of strangers, and rules for impersonal 
engagement. (Though, as NissenbaumÕs example of the jogger in the park vividly 
exemplifies, this sort of anonymity is also being eroded by technologies of identification.) 
Online architectures create spaces for encounter, performance, and play. Pseudonymous 
spaces are a condition for such play because they are a security against the tyranny of 
intimacy. They provide a protection against social sanction and pressure, to be sure (as we 
would emphasise in the question of anonymous voting), but more to the point here is the 
positive potential for social interaction structured according to the impersonal rules of the 
forum. Wendy Chun has for this reason warned of the downside of shifting from a Ôpublic 
anonymousÕ Internet to a friendly space with no anonymity, and emphasises the value of 
maintaining boundaries between different domains and enabling play. Chun observes that our 
friending behaviours (connectedness, in my terms) 
breachÑmake leakyÑthe borders between work and leisure, acquaintances and family, 
public and private, and on- and offline compromise and expose us in unwanted ways, 
from school admissions committees who surreptitiously examine potential student 
profiles to employers who use posted comments as bases for firing employees.  61
This is important because social media Ôwork technically and socially by breaching É the 
boundary between private and publicÕ.  62
While the Internet was not yet a part of public life when Sennett wrote of the Ôfall of 
public manÕ, aspects of his approach can be seen in a strong defence of the culture of 
anonymity by David Auerbach (2015). Auerbach takes on a hard case, that of 4chan, an 
online space in which interactions are anonymous and evanescent, where in my terms there is 
neither connectedness nor durability. Such spaces Ôoffer a lack of accountability for what one 
Chun 2015, p. 106.61
Ibid. See also Beyer (2014) on caring for pseudonyms in online environments. 62
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says, a way to hide unappealing facts about oneself, and an instant escape hatch if things get 
unpleasantÕ.  But precisely these features form the basis for a distinctive community 63
characterised by what he calls anonymity as culture or ÔA-cultureÕ.  Social networks such as 64
Facebook rely on revealing usersÕ characteristics such as age, race, gender, and level of 
education, and thereby connect users to offline sources of social status. A-culture removes the 
possibility of distinction by characteristics and instead relies Ôon interests rather than the 
personalities of users to sustain a community, and involves an Ôintentional disconnect 
between oneÕs real life and oneÕs online persona (or, frequently, personae)Õ. The evanescence 
of pseudonymity in these spacesÑwhile some pseudonyms are durable across time on a 
single site, others persist only for the duration of one conversation thread, or even one 
commentÑcreates an Ôeconomy of suspicionÕ, as Ôpervasive gaps in information and this 
focus on masquerade produce a general sense of unrealityÕ. With so little stability and a 
pervasive decontextualisation of statements, it is not only hard to tell true from false, and 
sincere from insincere; the instability generates a Ôconflicted coexistence of sincere personal 
involvement and detached spectatorshipÕ. However, this sense of unreality is precisely the 
point and the attraction of anonymous online spaces. They are spaces for Ôunserious, 
disinterestedÕ recreation, that is, for play: 
The anonymity of A-culture has unexpectedly provided the conditions for a 
reestablishment of what Huizinga thought had disappeared by the nineteenth century, 
with its increasingly bourgeois, professionalized, and industrialized cultures. With those 
elements of individual identity that might be divisive and might reference the positions 
and responsibilities of ÔrealÕ life obscured, freedom is reestablished. What looks like 
anarchy from the outside is rarely actually anarchic; it is play, carefully regimented and 
circumscribed. 
A-culture is a Ôspace for playing with unrestricted notions of identityÕ. 
The importance of using anonymity to enable a degree of playfulness with identity 
would seem to put Auerbach close to Sennett. So too does the general idea that anonymity 
Auerbach 2015 (this is an unpaginated online text, so I cannot provide page citations).63
See also Coleman (2015) for a nuanced discussion of the culture, structure, and activism of ÔAnonymousÕ.64
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creates the possibility of a cultural space distinct from the social world as defined by 
substantive connections between people that persist over time and become entangled in ways 
we cannot control. But one important difference is that Sennett is concerned precisely with 
masking within public life. In AuerbachÕs description of 4chan, anonymity is an escape from 
the pressures of publicity, public morality, the weight of distinctions based on background, 
from being Ôcorralled into demographic groupsÕ and placed in a Ôhierarchy of prestigeÕ. 
Anonymity enables seclusion from publicity. Thus, he comments on the Ôinward lookingÕ 
nature of anonymous online spaces, and notes that ÔA-culture contains far fewer collateral 
indicators of Òeveryday realityÓ than one finds on Twitter or FacebookÕ. The Ôoffline worldÕ, 
he says, Ôis to be minimized, not invokedÕ. It is its seclusion that enables its Ôpersistence and 
autonomy as a space of playÕ. For Sennett, by contrast, pseudonymity is a means to publicity, 
providing a repertoire for performance in public at the same time as a means of protection of 
oneÕs intimate life. Masking for Sennett is a social leveller, to be sure, which excludes or at 
least suspends distinctions and status. Yet for Sennett the point of masking is not, as in 
AuerbachÕs A-culture, to Ôminimize the offline worldÕ, but rather to constitute public 
discourse. Auerbach assimilates the connected world of Facebook to public life, and frames 
anonymous space in terms of seclusion and protection from that world; Sennett would (I 
suspect) hold that the world of Facebook is a false form of publicity, a dangerous 
combination of intimacy and publicity. On my account, the disconnectÑwhich Auerbach 
rightly emphasisesÑÔbetween oneÕs real life and oneÕs online personaÕ can also enable public 
engagement. Furthermore, I suggest that reiterated identity and hence reputation can serve to 
underpin a minimal sort of communicative accountability while preserving the levelling 
effect of anonymity. 
The evanescent anonymity described by Auerbach brings into relief the significance of 
the dimension of durability. While many of the critics considered above focus on 
connectedness as a means to accountability, in the sense of a process of justification to an 
external public audience that would lead to greater consistency between publicly acceptable 
justifications and actions, I want to emphasise the distinct mode of communicative 
accountability which involves justification to an internal audience in a particular context, and 
which requires only the durability of identity over time in that context. This sort of 
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justification is analogous to the way deliberation might work in particular institutional 
settings, where participants would need to respond to demands for justification and do so in a 
way that was plausibly continuous over time. They would not be held accountable for any 
differences between the opinions expressed in the room and how they behave outside the 
room. But the claim about deliberative spaces is that in the room there would be a filtering 
and refinement of preferences, beliefs, and attitudes as a result of the process of making and 
meeting demands for justification.  
The durability of identity within a particular discursive context is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for the possibility of at least minimal deliberation. By minimal 
deliberation I mean an Ôexchange of arguments for or against somethingÕ.  Deliberation in 65
this sense is communication oriented to the formation of a collective opinion or decision, that 
aims to persuade others in virtue of its validity (whether of claims to moral rightness or 
factual accuracy) rather than in virtue of the credibility of threats.  This ÔminimalÕ 66
conception of deliberation is a good deal thinner than the ÔclassicÕ accounts of deliberation. It 
does not require that deliberation is oriented to consensus. Nor does it insist on a criterion of 
competence or information. Minimal deliberation also does not emphasise equality or 
inclusion. And it does not demand empathy, respect, civility, or an orientation to the common 
good. However, ÔminimalÕ deliberation in the sense of an exchange of arguments is 
nonetheless more than just everyday talk, sociable conversation, or discussion. It involves not 
just the declaration of statements or positions or reasons, but an exchange of arguments. That 
is, minimal deliberation requires engagement with interlocutors, as opposed to merely the 
delivery of monologues. It is fair to say this is perhaps the central desideratum in most 
accounts of deliberation, which include reference to Ômutual justifiabilityÕ and Ôrational 
dialogueÕ, and a Ôreason-giving requirementÕ.  The minimal conception gets to a core feature 67
of what we want from public deliberation, namely, an exchange of arguments in a context in 
which demands for communicative accountability can be made and met. In social-
psychological terms, such argumentation is demanding, risky, and uncomfortable. It invokes 
Landemore (2013, p.214), following Aristotle: ÔDeliberative speaking urges us either to do or not to do 65
somethingÕ (Rhetoric, Bk.1, 1358b8).
Manin 2005.66
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the discomfort associated with conflict.  It demands articulacy and brings the risk of 68
embarrassment Ôif we do not know or cannot articulate what we believeÕ.  As Schudson puts 69
it, Ôpeople prefer sociable conversation to potentially explosive conversation. Such talk is 
threatening enough to require formal or informal rules of engagement.Õ  It makes sense that 70
in spaces where oneÕs real-name identity is not invoked and oneÕs statements are not 
connected across different spheres of life (or at least online life) or liable to be revealed in 
other contexts, then one might be more willing to speak up, to test claims, to advance 
arguments. My central point is not, as in KuranÕs and AllenÕs arguments, that anonymity 
permits people to speak Ôdark truthsÕ or reveal their private convictions (though it may do that 
too), but that it enables people to engage in public discussion without exposing themselves to 
the weightiness of having their statements connected to their real-world selves, and thus 
promotes a degree of deliberative playfulness.  71
The minimal conception of deliberation, however, also requires reciprocity or 
communicative accountability.  Deliberation requires an exchange of arguments, which is to 72
say, a degree of back and forth over time in response to arguments, information, and demands 
for clarification and justification. This in turn requires continuity of identities of interlocutors, 
at least in that particular context. Continuity is necessary for communicative accountability. 
Communicative accountability, to put it another way, involves a demand for consistency. 
Warren 1996.68
Schudson 1997, p. 304. See also Mansbridge (1980, p. 60Ð4), where she reports talking to participants in 69
Vermont town hall meetings, where one farmer noted that Ôit does take a little bit of courage. 
ÒSpecially if you get up and make a boo-boo. I mean you make a mistake and say something, then 
people would never get up and say anything again. They feel themselves inferior.ÓÕ Of participants at 
her meeting, 49% were women, but only 29% of those who spoke at all were women, and they only 
made 8% of what she classified as Ômajor statements of opinionÕ, and initiated none of the 
Ôcontroversial exchangesÕ (ibid., p.106). 
Schudson 1997, p. 306.70
It is something like this weightiness that concerns Nagel in his account of the value of concealment and 71
conventions of reticence and non-acknowledgement in public discourse. His resistance to Ôthe 
invasiveness of a public culture that insists on settling too many questionsÕ (Nagel 1998, p. 28) 
captures the sense that a healthy public sphere may require a degree of concealment of oneÕs attitudes 
or beliefs in order to avoid contentious discussions. However, anonymity or pseudonymity, which 
enable public speech while concealing the source, can resist the ÔinvasivenessÕ of public culture at the 
same time as they enable contentious discussions, and thus may serve more effectively to promote 
plurality than a tacit agreement to not talk about uncomfortable issues. 
I prefer the term Ôcommunicative accountabilityÕ here because ÔreciprocityÕ is often associated with 72
respectfulness, and what I want to focus on is simply the possibility of making and meeting demands 
for justification.
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Making a demand for justification requires a continuity of identity such that one can get a 
response or recognise the absence of a response. In what we might call a local context, this is 
an intuitive (and necessary, though not sufficient) requirement of good deliberation. It means 
that when you say one thing and then immediately say something contradictory, or something 
which implies a contradictory position, you can be called out on it. Others can extrapolate 
and make claims about the implications of your position, and challenge you to either defend 
those implications or refute the reasoning that would connect those implications to your 
position. Real name identity should share this feature in so far as it too involves durable 
identities. But by adding connectedness it opens the door to the deliberative dangers of 
ÔsociableÕ conversation. In this context 
people talk primarily with others who share their values and they expect that 
conversation will reinforce them in the views they already share. In these 
conversations, people may test their opinions, to be sure, and venture ideas that may not 
be warmly received, but they do so in full knowledge that they agree on fundamentals 
and that the assumptions that they share will make such experimentation safe.  73
To exaggerate the point just a little: without durability, communicative accountability (in my 
second sense) is easily evaded; with connectedness it is rarely demanded. 
While most empirical studies of online news commenting only distinguish between 
real-name and anonymous commenters, there is some work suggesting the distinct 
deliberative qualities of pseudonymous discourse in online political talk. The online comment 
management company Disqus distinguishes between the use of real names for authentication 
and the use of pseudonyms for expression, and have compared commenting behaviour under 
anonymity, pseudonymity, and real-name conditions.  They used a ratings system to enable 74
users to evaluate comments, and found that comments made under conditions of 
pseudonymity were rated by other users as having the highest quality. The Huffington Post 
Schudson 1997, p. 302.73
Disqus manages the comment space for many online news publications, and in this study they draw on data 74
from 60m users and 500m comments. See <https://disqus.com/research/pseudonyms/>.
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also provides an interesting case.  They changed their commenting space over two years 75
from an initial policy of anonymity, in which users could easily set up new and multiple 
accounts (in my terms, low durability), to a policy of requiring registration of accounts to 
verify user identities but allowing users to maintain outward-facing pseudonyms (durable but 
not connected), and finally outsourcing their commenting platform to Facebook, so that 
comments appeared with an account name and photo and comments appeared not only on the 
news page but also (depending on settings) on the usersÕ Facebook pages. The researchers 
gathered 50m comments on news articles featured on the Huffington PostÕs front page across 
the period of these changes, from January 2013 to January 2015, and found that while the use 
of offensive language declined over all three phases, the bulk of the decline took place in the 
shift from anonymous to pseudonymous commenting. The decline in offensive language was 
also uneven: the real-name phase showed a higher density of insults directed at ÔyouÕ than in 
the pseudonymous phase. Furthermore, between the pseudonymous and real-name space, the 
pattern of interaction changed markedly, from conversations among commenters (with 
multiple sub-threads and comments on comments), to a greater proportion of direct 
comments on the article. Other qualitative research has suggested that connectedness brings 
the risk that participants may avoid confrontation, seek conformity, narrow the scope of 
criticism, and avoid holding people communicatively accountable.  These studies are far 76
from decisive, but they at least ground the claim that pseudonymity has distinct deliberative 
potentials that are worth further investigation. 
III. Conclusion 
Thinking of online identity in terms of durability and connectedness casts a new light on an 
important but under-recognised aspect of online communication, and in particular suggests 
the deliberative value of creating spaces within which people can maintain stable or durable 
identities and yet remain disconnected. My suggestion is that pseudonymity can enable the 
See Fredheim, Moore and Naughton 2015, and Fredheim and Moore 2016.75
This claim is supported by a recent study of online commenting, which suggests two broad models of 76
audience participation: Ôcommunities of debateÕ and Ôhomogeneous communitiesÕ, conducted by Ruiz 
et al. (2011).
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creation of spaces in which people are not bound by demands for consistency across different 
domains of their life, but only by the more limited demand for consistency within the forum 
itself. Durability within the context of the forum enables others to challenge, question, and 
criticise the claims made in the course of debate. Furthermore, by being disconnected from 
other sites of social status, it may lower the risks associated with speaking in public. The 
concepts of durability and connectedness might also help us think about the value of 
deliberation Ôbehind closed doorsÕ in more familiar contexts such as parliaments, juries, and 
minipublics. Although there are few obvious face-to-face analogues for pseudonymity, there 
are other mechanisms (such as rules or norms of non-disclosure or non-attribution), which 
seem to play a similar role, preventing statements from being linked to particular individuals 
and thereby travelling with them into different social contexts. The analysis in this paper thus 
sheds a new light on aspects of face-to-face deliberation, but at the same time suggests what 
is genuinely new about communication online. 
The argument in this article will, I hope, support the rapidly developing empirical work 
on the effects of online institutional design. A good deal of this online institutional design is 
done by default, as various discussion platforms tinker with their structures with a range of 
purposes in mind, from efficiency to the user experience (though rarely with the goal of 
enhancing the potential for public deliberation). The argument developed in this paper 
suggests that an architecture enabling durable pseudonyms may better promote minimal 
deliberation than real name or pure anonymity designs, a claim that would be worth exploring 
empirically. Does the practice of durable pseudonymity lead to endogenous constraints in a 
way that privileges argument? Is deliberative quality better in a minimal sense in 
pseudonymous spaces? The point is not to declare what would be the proper mix of design 
features to enable or promote deliberation, but rather to provide distinctions that might be 
usefully taken up in empirical research. Identifiability is not, it must be stressed, the only or 
even the most influential aspect of the design of online discussion spaces. Indeed, there is 
good reason to think that moderation is the most important factor in shaping the quality of 
discourse online,  and the make-up of the audience is also clearly crucial. My claim is 77
simply that there are distinct deliberative potentials associated with pseudonymous 
communication that are worth further attention. Given the increasing numbers of people who 
See Grimmelmann 201577
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read and discuss the news online, and in particular through social media platforms,  my 78
argument suggests that news providers concerned with promoting public deliberation should 
use architectures that enable durable identities, requiring registration that demands 
commitment and communicative accountability from users and makes it harder for trolls and 
abusive users to act with impunity, but without demanding connectedness. There are good 
reasons, from the point of view of the quality of public deliberation (and not just from the 
point of view of fear of monopoly power and links to the national security state), to resist the 
concentration and integration of online discursive platforms. When it comes to online forums 
and platforms, there are good reasons why not everything should be connected. 
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